Curating the infosphere: Luciano Floridi's Philosophy of Information as the foundation for Library and Information Science by Bawden, D. & Robinson, L.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Bawden, D. & Robinson, L. (2017). Curating the infosphere: Luciano Floridi's 
Philosophy of Information as the foundation for Library and Information Science. Journal of 
Documentation, doi: 10.1108/JD-07-2017-0096 
This is the accepted version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/17713/
Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/JD-07-2017-0096
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
	 1	
Editorial	review	
Published	in	Journal	of	Documentation,	2017,	vol.73,	issue	5	
	
Curating	the	infosphere:	Luciano	Floridi's	Philosophy	of	Information	as	the	
foundation	for	Library	and	Information	Science	
	
David	Bawden	and	Lyn	Robinson	
Centre	for	Information	Science	
City,	University	of	London	
	
	
1.	Introduction	
The	purpose	of	this	editorial	review	is	to	re-examine	the	prospect	that	Luciano	Floridi's	
Philosophy	of	Information	(PI),	and	information	ethics	(IE)	may	serve	as	the	conceptual	
foundation	for	library	and	information	science	(LIS),	and	that	LIS	may	thus	be	seen	as	
applied	PI.	This	re-examination	is	timely,	fifteen	years	after	this	proposal	was	first	made,	in	
light	of	the	development	and	wider	acceptance	of	the	PI	concept	itself,	of	advances	in	
information	technologies	and	changes	in	the	information	environment,	and	of	the	
consequent,	and	continuing,	need	for	LIS	to	re-evaluate	its	nature	and	role.	
	
We	first	give	a	brief	and	selective	account	of	the	introduction	and	consequent	reception	of	
the	idea	of	PI	as	the	basis	for	LIS;	more	detailed	account	of	the	origins	of	PI,	and	its	initial	
reception	within	LIS,	have	been	given	by	Furner	(2010),	by	Fyffe	(2015),	and	by	Van	der	Veer	
Martens	(2015).	Then	we	consider	whether	such	a	basis	is,	in	fact,	needed,	and,	if	so,	what	
the	other	possibilities	might	be,	and	then	examine	five	particular	aspects	of	the	relation	
between	LIS	and	PI.	The	conclusions,	for	those	who	do	not	make	to	the	end,	are	that	such	a	
foundation	is	indeed	needed,	and	that	PI	is	the	most	appropriate	basis.	
	
2.	History	of	PI	and	LIS	
The	basics	of	PI	are	now	quite	widely	understood,	so	that	we	do	not	need	give	an	account	of	
them,	referring	the	reader	to	Floridi	(2011,	2016A)	for	details,	and	to	Van	der	Veer	Martens	
(2015)	for	a	briefer	account.		
		
We	will,	however,	remind	readers	that	PI	is	a	genuinely	radical	over-turning	of	much	of	the	
basis	of	all	previous	philosophy,	inspired	by	the	prevalence	and	significance	of	digital	
technologies	to	argue	that	everything	is	fundamentally	information	(Ess	2009).	It	therefore	
goes	far	beyond	issues	of	computing	and	LIS,	but	that	does	not	mean	that	it	is	not	highly	
relevant	to	them,	nor	that	it	disregards,	or	is	incompatible	with,	what	has	gone	before.	For	
example,	the	central	PI	concept	that	the	ultimate	ethical	good	is	the	flourishing	of	the	
infosphere	echoes	Wiener's	idea	of	flourishing	as	the	overarching	goal	of	computer	ethics	
(Ess	2009),	while	its	'levels	of	abstraction'	formalism	(Florid	2016B)	should	evoke	resonances	
of	numerous	LIS	contexts	and	issues,	including	metadata	creation,	resource	description,	
facet	analysis,	taxonomy	and	classification,	and	interface	design.	PI,	while	certainly	novel,	
cannot	therefore	be	seen	as	irrelevant	or	inimical	to	LIS's	worldview.	
		
The	explicit	idea	that	LIS	might	be	seen	as	applied	PI	was	introduced	by	Herold	(2001),	in	a	
wide-ranging	survey	of	theories	and	philosophies	of	information	which	might	have	some	
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relation	to	librarianship.	He	suggested	that	as	"all	things	in	all	libraries	at	all	times	became	
information",	information	might	be	"the	deepest	common	agenda"	for	both	philosophy	and	
librarianship,	and	that	Floridi's	PI	was	of	particular	relevance,	with	its	arguments	"bold,	and	
innovative	and	well-expressed".	Herold	had,	however,	some	concerns	as	to	whether	the	
sense	of	information	in	PI,	which	he	associated	with	that	used	in	computing,	was	too	narrow	
and	uniform	for	the	library	tradition.		
	
The	idea	was	developed	by	Floridi	in	a	2002	paper	in	Social	Epistemology,	and	revisited	two	
years	later	in	a	response	to	series	of	critiques	in	a	special	issue	Library	Trends	(Floridi	2002A,	
2004).	These	two	papers	alone	have	been	cited	more	than	200	times,	and	we	make	no	
attempt	to	comment	on	all	these	instances	of	the	reception,	preferring	to	focus	selectively	
on	some	main	themes;	see	Van	der	Veer	Martens	(2015)	for	more	detailed	commentary.	
	
Floridi's	2002	paper	made	three	main	points:	that	LIS	needs	a	foundational	philosophy;	
that	social	epistemology	(SE)	cannot	provide	a	satisfactory	foundation	for	LIS,	while	PI	can,	
provided	that	it	is	understood	that	LIS's	area	of	interest	is	information	instantiated	in	
documents;	and	that	adopting	PI	as	its	basis,	as	regarding	LIS	as	applied	PI,	means	that	LIS,	
in	its	own	research	is	contributing	the	development	of	PI	itself;	an	organic	and	synergistic	
relation,	far	from	the	adoption	of	external	'foreign'	philosophies	as	a	basis	for	LIS.	Each	of	
these	is	points	is	discussed	below.	
	
This	paper	caused	the	first	real	interest	in	PI	among	the	LIS	community,	as	was	reflected	in	a	
special	issue	of	Library	Trends	(issue	3	of	volume	52,	2004)	devoted	to	PI	and	its	relation	to	
LIS.	The	editor	noted	that	the	impetus	for	this	was	provided	by	Floridi's	1999	monograph	
Philosophy	and	Computing:	an	introduction,	and	"more	for	what	it	did	not	say	about	[LIS]	
than	otherwise"	(Herold	2004,	p.	373),	rather	than	Floridi's	Social	Epistemology	paper,	or	
Herold's	2001	remarks	on	PI	and	LIS.	Indeed,	of	the	fifteen	substantive	papers	in	the	issue,	
only	a	minority	made	explicit	and	substantive	mention	of	Floridi	and	PI,	the	other	
addressing	other	philosophical	issues.	The	two	papers	which	offered	a	critique	of	Floridi	and	
Herold	exemplified	the	nature	of	the	debate	on	the	relevance	of	PI	to	LIS	which	was	to	
follow,	and	which	to	an	extent	still	continues.	Spink	and	Cole	(2004)	supported	the	idea	of	
LIS	as	applied	PI,	suggesting	this	to	be	synergistic	with	developing	concepts	of	human	
information	behaviour.	Cornelius	took	the	opposite	view,	arguing	that	the	idea	was	"too	
innocent	of	LIS	practice	to	be	accepted	without	revision"	(Cornelius	2004,	p.	377),	
considering	that	its	account	of	information	was	too	limited	to	encompass	the	social	contexts	
of	LIS	practice.	
		
Floridi's	're-assessment',	which	closed	this	journal	issue,	aimed	to	clarify	issues	from	the	
2002	introduction.	Four,	of	particular	importance	in	that	they	have	re-emerged	at	various	
times	as	objections	to	the	LIS	as	applied	PI	proposal,	may	be	mentioned.	First,	in	apparent	
response	to	Cornelius,	and	others	who	considered	PI	not	'social	enough'	to	serve	as	a	theory	
for	LIS,	Floridi	responds	that	there	are	three	levels	at	which	theory	may	be	applied,	for	LIS	as	
for	other	disciplines:	the	level	of	day	to	day	routine	practice;	the	level	of	the	delineation	of	
the	discipline	and	its	knowledge	base,	as	given	in	academic	courses;	and	the	foundational,	
and	necessarily	abstract,	level.	PI	operates	at	the	last	of	these,	at	is	unreasonable	to	expect	
it	to	deal	with	all	three,	though	it	may	certain	inform	the	first	two,	and	act	as	a	basis	and	
stimulus	for	theories	of	these	levels.	Second,	it	wrong	to	imagine	that	PI	regards	factual	
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information	as	the	only	kind,	or	even	the	most	important	kind,	of	information.	Third	that,	
although	PI	regards	information	and	knowledge,	and	necessarily	truthful,	this	does	not	
ignore	the	fact	that	"libraries	are	full	of	'false	knowledge'"	(Floridi	2004,	p.	662).	It	simply	
means	that,	from	the	PI	perspective,	LIS	deals	with	'semantic	content'	recorded	in	
documents;	semantic	content	including	information	(true),	misinformation	(false),	and	
disinformation	(deliberately	false);	see	Fallis	(2016)	for	a	detailed	discussion,	and	a	note	on	
the	value	to	LIS	research	on	accuracy	of	information	of	the	PI	viewpoint).		The	task	of	LIS	is	
the	stewardship	of	the	semantic	environment.	Fourth,	that	PI	leads	to	a	fully	worked	out	IE,	
with	all	the	informational	entities	of	the	infosphere	having	an	intrinsic	value;	the	
improvement	of	the	infosphere	is	the	primary	ethical	duty,	and	one	which	has	a	strong	
relevance	to	LIS,	the	discipline	which,	perhaps	more	than	any	other,	has	the	task	of	
stewardship	of	the	infosphere.		
	
This	largely	specified	all	that	was	needed	to	clarify	and	justify	the	relationship	between	PI	
and	LIS;	however,	it	was	to	be	over	a	decade	before	this	achieved	any	significant	degree	of	
acceptance.	
			
Some	years	later,	the	concepts	of	the	'Fourth	Revolution'	and	the	'infosphere'	became	more	
widely	known	as	associated	with	PI	(Floridi	2009),	enhancing	its	appeal	to	those	in	LIS,	and	
were	reflected	in	2008-09,	with	two	special	issues	of	Ethics	and	Information	Technology	
(volume	10,	issue	2-3,	on	'Luciano	Floridi's	Philosophy	of	Information	and	Information	
Ethics:	critical	reflections	and	the	state	of	the	art')	and	of	The	Information	Society	(volume	
25,	issue	3,	2009,	on	'The	philosophy	of	information,	its	nature,	and	future	developments')	
were	devoted	to	PI.	Although	not	strictly	within	the	LIS	literature,	these	illustrated	the	
developing	reach	of	PI	into	areas	of	clear	relevance	to	LIS:	IE	and	law,	and	the	nature	of	
modern	information-based	society.	In	particular,	Burk	(2008)	noted	the	potential	of	Floridi's	
IE	for	revising	legal	codes	relating	to	data,	information	and	documents	in	various	ways,	
Tavani	(2008)	commended	the	theory	of	privacy	emerging	from	PI	as	particularly	relevant	
for	the	new	digital	environment,	while	Briggle	and	Mitcham	(2009)	argued	that	PI	could	be	
extended	to	encompass	information	culture.	Capurro	(2008)	took	a	more	critical	view,	
arguing,	in	a	somewhat	similar	vein	to	Cornelius,	for	a	more	humanistic	and	hermeneutic	
approach,	and	expressing	a	particular	concern	that	that	PI's	emphasis	on	the	intrinsic	
informational	value	of	all	entities	undermines	a	concern	for	humans.		
		
Over	the	next	five	years,	a	series	of	texts	appeared,	giving	a	fuller	account	of	PI	(Floridi	
2010A,	Floridi	2011,	Floridi,	2013A,	Floridi	2014).	PI	also	made	a	appearance	in	some	of	the	
standard	texts	of	LIS,	being	briefly	mentioned	by	Davis	and	Shaw	(2011)	and	by	Stock	and	
Stock	(2013),	and	given	a	more	detailed	treatment	by	Bawden	and	Robinson	(2012),	who	
considered	it	the	best	available	option	for	a	philosophical	foundation	for	LIS.			
			
In	a	review	of	philosophy	in	LIS	generally,	Furner	(2010,	p.	171)	suggested	that	the	reasons	
for	"the	relative	infrequency	with	which	Floridi's	work	has	been	cited	in	the	LIS	literature"	at	
that	time	included	its	perceived	close	association	with	computer	science,	and	hence	
exclusively	with	the	technical	and	systems	aspects	of	LIS,	and	the	publication	of	much	PI	
material	in	sources	unfamiliar	to	LIS	researchers.	He	argued	that	"it	would	be	a	gross	error,	
however,	to	conclude	that	[PI]	is	somehow	tangential	to	the	primary	concerns	of	[LIS].	Such	
a	conclusion	could	be	drawn	only	from	a	surface	reading	of	the	relevant	works"	(Furner	
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2010,	p.	171).	Similarly,	Van	der	Veer	Martens	noted	in	2015	that	there	had	been	little	
discussion	of	the	potential	use	of	PI	in	LIS	in	more	than	a	decade	since	the	issue	was	raised	
by	the	2002	Social	Epistemology	article,	despite	the	publication	of	these	texts,	and	that	the	
provocative	questions	addressed	by	Floridi	to	LIS	remained	largely	unanswered	(Van	der	
Veer	Martens	2015,	p.	320).	
	
A	special	issue	of	Library	Trends	(number	3	of	issue	63,	2015)	was	devoted	to	"Exploring	
philosophies	of	information",	with	a	series	of	papers	devoted	to	a	wide	variety	of	topics	at	
the	intersection	of	philosophy	and	LIS.	Five	of	the	fifteen	substantive	articles	were	devoted	
wholly	or	to	a	large	extent	to	an	analysis	of	aspects	of	PI,	while	five	others	mentioned	it	to	a	
limited	extent;	an	indication	of	considerable,	though	far	from	over-whelming,	interest	in	PI	
as	the	basis	for	LIS.	This	issue	featured	the	first	detailed	analysis	of	the	value	of	PI	from	an	
LIS	viewpoint	(Van	der	Veer	Martens	2015).	Also	notable	as	indicators	of	the	increasing	
acceptance	of	PI	as	a	foundation	for	LIS	are:	the	paper	of	Dinneen	and	Brauner	(2015),	who	
show	how	entities	and	events	central	to	the	information	sciences	are	better	described	by	PI	
than	by	alternative	foundational	theories;	and	the	paper	of	Compton,	who,	similarly	
comparing	foundational	bases,	while	not	committing	himself	to	the	superiority	of	PI	
concludes	that	it	is	"another	essential	perspective	that	contributes	to	a	more	accurate	and	
comprehensive	understanding	of	what	the	diverse	field	of	LIS	is"	(Compton	2015,	p.	557).		
	
There	has	been	little	overt	criticism	of	the	idea	that	PI	may	be	a	good	foundation	for	LIS,	
dissenters	perhaps	preferring	to	remain	quiet.	The	most	direct	criticism	has	come	from	
Cornelius,	who	repeated	and	extended	his	2004	critique	in	a	later	paper,	arguing	that	"I	do	
not	think	he	[Floridi]	has	developed	the	term	[information]	in	a	way	that	usefully	builds	an	
information	science	...	whatever	else	he	may	achieve...	He	imposes	restrictions	on	himself	
that	LIS	cannot	meet,	and	whatever	insights	his	work	offers,	they	do	not	allow	the	
construction	of	a	concept	of	information	that	LIS	practitioners	could	relate	to"	(Cornelius	
2014,	p.	201).	Cornelius	objects	to	Floridi's	deriving	his	idea	of	information	from	data,	and	
that	to	something	objective	in	the	world,	preferring	to	regard	information	for	LIS	as	
subjective	and	socially	constructed,	with	no	explicit	link	to	data.	Similar	sentiments	have	
been	expressed	by	Capurro	(2008)	and	others.	As	will	be	made	clear	later,	this	is	not	an	
objection	which	we	find	compelling.	
			
Fyffe	(2015),	in	the	first	article	giving	specific	and	detailed,	though	critical,	support	from	an	
LIS	perspective	for	PI	as	the	basis	for	LIS,	focuses	on	Floridi’s	ideas	of	librarianship	as	
stewardship	of	the	semantic	environment,	seeing	this	as	a	more	appropriate	basis	than	SE.	
Specifically	he	considers	a	stewardship	based	on	the	IE	concept	of	‘ontic	trust’	by	which	all	
objects	with	some	informational	nature	are	worthy	of	respect.	He	sees	this	as	offering	
support,	in	particular,	for	activities	around	preservation	of	information	objects	in	a	
networked,	digital	environment.	Fyffe	recognises	the	danger	that	“placing	stewardship	at	
the	centre	of	LIS	risks	suggesting	that	librarianship’s	business	is	primarily	with	‘stuff’	rather	
than	research,	learning,	and	the	users	of	library	and	information	services,	an	old-fashioned	
view”	(p.	269).	He	counters	this	by	arguing	for	an	emphasis	on	the	information	user’s	role	in	
managing	their	own	information	environment,	making	clear,	and	original,	links	to	
information	behaviour	and	information	literacy,	core	aspects	of	LIS.	[Floridi	(2017)	has	also	
drawn	attention	to	ways	in	which	the	information	foraging	concept	of	Pirolli	and	Card	
(Pirolli	2007)	is	relevant	to	information	behaviour	in	the	infosphere.]	Van	der	Veer	Martens	
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(2017)	supports	and	builds	on	the	idea	of	the	relevance	of	ontic	trust	for	the	practice	of	LIS,	
relating	it	to	ideas	of	document	theory	which	extends	the	range	of	what	may	be	considered,	
for	the	purposes	of	LIS,	an	information-bearing	object,	and	invoking	Floridi’s	infosphere	as	
the	domain	within	LIS’s	stewardship	role	should	be	exercised.	Since	then,	Bawden	and	
Robinson	(2016C)	have	proposed	that	PI	might	be	applied	to	questions	of	knowledge	and	
understanding	relevant	to	LIS,	and	a	study	at	City,	University	of	London	is	examining	
information	privacy	through	the	lens	of	PI	(Pedley	2017).	
		
PI	has	therefore	now	been	accepted	to	a	considerable	extent,	but	far	from	universally,	as	a	
basis	for	LIS,	and	the	first	studies	showing	how	this	may	be	beneficial	are	being	carried	out.	
We	set	out	below	why	we	believe	there	should	be	a	more	general	acceptance,	beginning	
with	a	consideration	of	whether	LIS	needs	such	a	basis	at	all.	
		
	
3.	Does	LIS	need	a	philosophy	
There	has	not	been	a	consensus	that	LIS	needs	a	foundational	philosophy.	For	example,	
Zwaldo	(1997),	noting	that,	in	their	respective	literatures,	librarians	rarely	discussed	
philosophy	and	philosophers	never	discussed	library	science,	suggested	that	it	was	
unnecessary,	and	rather	self-defeating,	to	seek	for	a	single	philosophy,	or	indeed,	
apparently,	any	philosophy	of	LIS.	And,	indeed,	most	LIS	practitioners,	and	indeed	most	LIS	
academics,	have	given	little	thought	to	the	philosophical	underpinnings	of	what	they	do.	
However,	as	Radford	and	Budd	(1997)	pointed	out	in	their	response	the	Zwaldo,	the	lack	of	
philosophical	discussion	in	the	theory	and	practice	of	LIS	does	not	mean	that	philosophy	
was	absent;	rather	that	philosophical	positions,	typically	rather	simplistic,	have	been,	and	
are,	assumed	and	taken	for	granted.	Further,	the	idea	that	LIS	has	not	been	interested	in	
philosophical	issues	is	far	from	the	truth;	as	Fallis	and	Whitcomb	(2009,	p.176)	write,	with	
numerous	examples,	"quite	a	lot	of	applied	epistemology	has	been	done	by	information	
scientists".	Nitecki	(1995)	reviews	a	large	body	of	literature	relating	LIS	and	philosophy	up	to	
1994.	
	
Floridi	(2002A)	argued	that	LIS	does	indeed	need	a	foundational	philosophy,	and	that	the	
discipline's	identity	crisis,	originating	in	the	1930s,	has	been	due	to	a	search	for	such	a	
foundation,	although	no	satisfactory	one	existed	before	PI.	LIS	and	philosophy	are	actually	
closely	associated,	because	of	the	topics	in	which	they	are	interested,	and	the	level	and	
scope	of	their	research.	Topics	of	central	interest	to	LIS,	including	issues	of	ontology,	
epistemology	and	ethics,	have	been	studied	within	philosophy	for	hundreds	of	years	(Floridi	
2002A,	Fallis	2004,	Warburton	2015).		
	
Others	who	have	argued	for	the	need	for	studies	of	the	philosophical	foundations	of	LIS	
from	various	perspectives	are	Compton	(2015),	Furner	(2014),	Robinson	and	Bawden	
(2014),	Furner	(2010),	Burton	(2009),	Carlin	(2009)	and	Labaree	and	Scimeca	(2008);	the	last	
give	several	reasons	for	the	importance	of	philosophy	for	LIS,	including	the	generation	of	
self-understanding	about	the	purpose	and	guiding	principles	of	the	discipline	and	
profession,	and	the	provision	of	a	basis	for	ethical	decision	making	in	practice.		
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We	suggest	that	these	arguments	in	favour	of	the	need	for	a	foundational	philosophy	of	LIS	
are	compelling,	and	that	PI	is	a	candidate	for	this.	In	the	next	section,	we	consider	what	the	
alternatives	might	be.	
	
4.	Alternatives	to	PI	
"[LIS]	researchers"	wrote	Floridi	(2002A,	p.	47),	"have	been	lured	by	a	variety	of	friendly	but	
pre-established	philosophies	instead	of	fighting	for	their	own	place	in	the	philosophical	
field".	Brian	Vickery	(1997,	p.458)	had	earlier	expressed	this	tendency	as	"examining	the	
ideas	of	a	…	philosopher,	extracting	principles	and	offering	them	as	presuppositions	upon	
which	information	science	may	be	based",	while	Zwaldo	(1997,	p.	105)	considered	that	"[for	
LIS]	obtaining	a	philosophy	is	something	like	borrowing	a	book	...	[but]	the	borrowed	
philosophies	do	not	really	belong	to	us,	always	seem	to	need	to	be	renewed,	and	we	end	up	
returning	them,	only	to	borrow	others".	Frohmann	(1992)	noted	that	"high-flying	LIS	
researchers	swoop	indiscriminately	down	upon	the	theoretical	terrain,	colonising	Popperian	
worlds,	or	cannibalizing	hermeneutics,	phenomenology,	general	systems	theory,	symbolic	
interactionism,	decision	theory,	existentialism,	structural-functionalism,	cognitive	science,	
or	philosophy	of	language,	to	name	just	a	few	of	the	theoretical	models	on	current	exhibit	in	
LIS	research	literature."	[Here,	as	elsewhere	in	the	LIS	literature,	the	terms	philosophy,	
theory	and	model	are	used	essentially	interchangeably.]	
	
The	recommendation	of	particular	philosophers	and	philosophies	as	a	basis	for	LIS	is	still	in	
evidence,	though	usually	focusing	at	one	part	or	aspect	of	the	discipline:	as	a	recent	
example	we	may	take	Buschman's	(2016)	advocacy	of	Dewey's	pragmatism	for	the	
librarianship	aspect	of	LIS.	Ideas	of	a	basis	for	the	whole	discipline	are,	and	have	always	
been,	thin	on	the	ground,	although	there	have	been,	and	are,	a	number	of	'general'	or	
'unified'	theories	of	information,	based	variously	on	probability,	semiotics,	hermeneutics,	
angeletics,	general	systems	theory,	and	other	foundations;	some	are	outlined	in	the	
contributions	in	the	volumes	edited	by	Ibekwe-SanJuan	and	Dousa	(2014)	and	by	Kelly	and	
Bielby	(2016).	But	none	has	gained	general	acceptance,	and,	crucially	for	our	purposes,	none	
has	been	seen	as	directly	applicable	to	the	concerns	of	LIS.				
	
Prior	to	PI,	there	have	been	only	two	suggestions	for	a	philosophy	which	might	provide	a	
foundation	for	all	of	LIS,	Popper	'three	worlds'	and	SE,	although	the	former	was	seen	as	
oriented	towards	the	'I'	of	LIS,	and	the	latter	toward	the	'L'.	
	
Popper's	three	world	ontology	(Popper	1992,	Notturno	2002),	and	particularly	his	World	3	
of	objective,	communicable	knowledge,	was	famously	heralded	by	Brookes	(1980)	as	the	
philosophical	foundation	for	information	science.	However,	its	impact	has	been	limited:	
although	it	has	been	popular	as	a	pedagogical	model	in	LIS,	and	some	writers	have	made	
more	detailed	use	of	it	in	an	LIS	context	-	see,	for	example,	Bawden	(2002),	Abbott	(2004),	
and	Spink	and	Cole	(2004)	-	it	has	not	generated	much	in	the	way	of	either	detailed	
conceptual	insight	or	practical	guidance,	being	silent	on	crucial	issues	such	as	information	
ethics	and	information	quality	(Bawden	and	Robinson	2016).	It	is	interesting	to	note	that	
Floridi	(2002A,	2002B)	regards	Popper's	conception	of	a	third	world	as	an	example	of	the	
evolution	of	PI	prior	to	the	digital	revolution,	and	that	he	himself	was	influenced	by	Popper	
ideas	of	knowledge	(Warburton	2015).	So,	while	Popper's	conception	cannot	in	itself	
provide	a	basis	for	LIS,	it	may	be	an	early	pre-cursor	of	such	a	foundation.		
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The	other	alternative	basis	suggested	for	LIS	has	been	SE,	not	least	because	its	originators,	
Shera	and	Egan,	were	librarians.	It	is	the	only	case	to	date	of	the	LIS	discipline	influencing	
mainstream	philosophy,	although	it	has	to	be	said	that	the	influence	has	been	somewhat	
limited,	and	that	SE	has	taken	on	a	distinctly	different	character,	through	the	influence	of	
philosophers	such	as	Goldman	and	Fuller;	for	fuller	discussion,	see,	for	example,	Furner	
(2002),	Zandonade	(2004),	Fallis	(2006)	and	Fuller	(2016).	The	strength	and	nature	of	the	
relation	between	SE	and	LIS	has	always	been	far	from	clear,	however.	Shera	himself	
expressed	different	ideas	within	the	same	book,	as	Floridi	(2002A)	noted:	rather	vaguely,	
there	is	"a	very	important	affinity	between	[SE]	and	librarianship"	(Shera	1970,	p.	88)	and	
more	definitely	"[SE]	can	give	librarianship	its	intellectual	foundation	for	which	we	have	
been	searching	for	so	long"	(Shera	1970,	p.	108).	
	
As	noted	above,	Floridi	(2002A)	argued	that	SE	could	not	be	an	appropriate	basis	for	LIS,	
since	SE	has	as	its	basis	the	study	of	knowledge	in	order	to	discover	truth.	Not	only	does	LIS	
have	to	to	deal	with	a	much	wider	range	of	sources	than	those	which	provide	'true	
knowledge',	but	its	remit	is	not	knowledge	itself,	but	the	sources	of	knowledge,	of	all	kinds.	
SE	and	LIS	are	certainly	related,	but	both	in	need	of	a	common	foundation,	which	Floridi	
identifies	as	PI.		Furner	(2015)	makes	the	same	point:	that	Egan	and	Shera	saw	LIS	as,	in	
essence,	"knowledge	studies",	but	that	field	would	be	far	wider	than	any	LIS	could	
reasonably	encompass,	and	Fyffe	(2015)	supports	Floridi's	arguments	against	SE	as	a	basis	
for	LIS.	
	
As	with	Popper's	three	worlds,	several	decades	of	debate	have	failed	to	show	that	SE	can	be	
fruitful	for	LIS	as	a	whole	(although	Fallis	(2006)	points	out	examples	within	LIS	where	it	is	of	
considerable	value),	and	on	these	grounds	alone	we	agree	with	Floridi	that	it	is	an	
unsuitable	foundation.	Fallis	(2006)	suggests	that,	even	if	we	accept	PI	as	the	foundation	for	
LIS,	SE	may	be	valuable	as	a	framework	for	some	LIS	activities,	those	focused	on	knowledge	
acquisition,	and	this	seems	a	helpful	viewpoint.	
	
There	seems,	therefore,	to	be	no	real	alternative	to	PI,	as	a	single	philosophical	basis	for	LIS.	
We	now	turn	to	look,	more	positively,	at	why,	and	how,	it	can	form	such	a	basis.			
	
5.	PI	as	basis:	why	and	how	
	"Insofar	as	PI	satisfies	the	role	of	a	theoretical	foundation	of	LIS",	Floridi	(2002A,	pp.	47-48)	
wrote	fifteen	years	ago,	"	it	provides	a	systematic	understanding	of	the	basic	concepts	
related	to	[LIS],	by	studying	the	nature,	values	and	goals	of	practices	in	librarianship.	The	
philosophy	of	librarianship	has	often	been	looking	for	some	external	source	of	theoretical	
support,	outside	its	real	scope.	By	contributing	to	the	development	of	PI,	LIS	can	carry	on	
the	task	of	developing	its	own	theoretical	foundation	from	within.	This	is	a	good	sign	that	
we	might	finally	have	taken	the	right	approach."			
	
The	broad	scope	of	PI	makes	it	an	attractive	candidate	as	a	basis	for	LIS,	since	it	suggests	
that	it	should	be	able	to	deal	with	any	and	all	future	developments.	As	Furner	(2010)	points	
out,	PI	is	firmly	within	the	mainstream	of	philosophy	per	se,	and	addresses	issues	both	of	
philosophy	of	LIS	(what	should	the	discipline	be)	and	philosophical	issues	within	LIS	
(typically	issues	of	ontology,	epistemology	and	ethics).	Merely	because	the	scope	of	PI	
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extends	well	beyond	that	of	LIS	does	not	imply	a	lack	of	relevance.	PI	also	fits	well	into	the	
general	development	of	philosophical	ideas	within	LIS,	as	Morán-Reyes	(2015,	p.	587)	points	
out:	"the	philosophy	of	information	is	congruent	with	library	tradition.	From	Bliss	and	
Danton's	discussion	in	the	1930s,	though	Egan	(without	Shera),	Nitecki,	and	Floridi,	there	
stands	a	very	definite	genealogical	line."	
	
Because	it	combines	both	Eastern	and	Western	philosophical	traditions,	being	part	of	a	
wider	environmental	ethics	movement	away	from	various	anthropocentric	philosophies,	PI	
offers	the	possibility	of	a	global	and	multicultural	approach	to	IE	(Ess	2009,	Floridi	2008);	
very	much	in	line	with	LIS's	concern	to	address	its	issues	in	this	way	(see,	for	example,	Aytac	
et	al.	2016,	and	references	therein).	For	Eastern	perspectives	on	PI,	see	Gang	(2007)	and	He	
(2017).	
	
5.1	Scope	of	LIS	
Floridi	(2002A)	suggested	that	LIS	as	applied	PI	may	be	defined	as	"the	discipline	concerned	
with	documents,	their	life	cycles	and	the	procedures,	techniques	and	devices	by	which	these	
are	implemented,	managed	and	regulated.	LIS	applies	the	fundamental	principles	and	
general	techniques	of	PI	to	solve	definite,	practical	problems	and	deal	with	specific,	
concrete	phenomena.	In	turn	it	conducts	empirical	research	for	practical	service-oriented	
purposes	(e.g.	conservation,	valorization,	education,	research,	communication	and	co-
operation),	thus	contributing	to	the	development	of	basic	research	in	PI)".			
	
This	is	very	close	to	many	definitions	of	LIS	proposed	from	within	that	discipline,	typified	by	
that	of	Bawden	and	Robinson	(2016B):	"Library	and	information	science	is	the	discipline	
which	studies	the	information	communication	chain:	all	aspects	of	the	creation,	
organization,	management,	communication	and	use	of	recorded	information.	It	supports	
the	professional	activities	of	the	collection	disciplines,	including	information	management,	
librarianship,	archiving	and	records	management."	
	
Further,	as	Furner	(2010)	points	out,	the	list	of	topics	in	the	information	life	cycle	given	by	
Floridi	in	a	discussion	of	PI	and	information	dynamics	(2002B,	p.	138),	including	authoring,	
collecting,	classifying,	retrieving,	accessing,	and	using,	are	very	similar	to	those	typically	
taken	as	the	concerns	of	LIS	specialists.	Indeed,	that	are	similar	to	those	proposed	by	
Robinson	(2009)	as	the	core	of	LIS.	This	shows	such	a	close	relation	between	PI	and	LIS,	that,	
together	with	the	similarity	in	definition,	it	seems	almost	perverse	to	argue	that	the	two	
cannot	enrich	each	other.		
	
There	are	other	examples	of	this	similarity.	For	example,	Floridi's	(2013B)	analysis	of	what	
constitutes	a	philosophical	question	in	terms	of	the	information	resources	required	to	
answer	them	has	interesting	resonances	with	LIS's	understanding	of	the	difference	between	
open	questions	(research)	and	closed	questions	(reference).	
		
Floridi	(2002A)	argues	that	a	test	for	a	good	philosophical	foundation	for	LIS	would	be	
whether	it	allowed	philosophy	learn	from	LIS,	and	we	believe	that	this	is	indeed	the	case,	if	
LIS	is	regarded	as	applied	PI.	
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One	feature	of	PI,	attractive	to	our	minds	is	that	it	encompasses,	and	links,	the	various	
information-like	entities	of	concern	to	LIS,	captured	in	the	popular,	if	simplistic,	data-
information-knowledge-wisdom	model.	Data	is,	of	course,	at	the	foundation	of	PI,	and	its	
importance	in	the	philosophy	of	information	has	been	discussed	by	Furner	and	by	Leonelli	
(2016).	Furner	(2017)	further	argues	for	the	importance	of	a	philosophy	of	data,	as	distinct	
from	treating	data	within	PI,	where	all	information	is	data	of	some	kind,	but	we	are	not	
entirely	convinced	by	Furner’s	arguments,	and	think	it	more	helpful	to	regard	information	
and	data	as	very	closely	connected,	as	in	PI,	with	attention	shifted	where	necessary	from	
information-centric	to	data-centric	(Floridi	and	Taddeo	2016).	We	consider,	unlike	others,	
for	example	Cornelius	(2014),	that	the	inclusion	of	data	within	PI	makes	it	more,	rather	than	
less	suitable,	as	a	basis	for	LIS,	if	only	on	the	pragmatic	grounds	that	data	handling	is	
becoming	ever	more	important	for	LIS	specialists	(Robinson	and	Bawden	2017).	It	helps	us	
avoid	what	Floridi	has	identified	as	an	undesirable	new	dualism	of	approaches:	one	which	
emphasises	data,	pattern,	syntax,	and	quantitative	methodology,	and	one	which	favours	
information,	meaning,	semantics,	and	qualitative	methods	(Bawden	2016).	If	we	are	to	
integrate	the	two,	as	seems	essential,	then	PI	seems	the	best	candidate	to	achieve	this.	
			
Although	PI	has	hitherto	concentrated	on	data	and	information,	it	may	also	be	extended	to	
considerations	of	knowledge	and	of	understanding;	see	Bawden	and	Robinson	(2016C)	for	a	
provisional	approach	to	this.	
	
Dinneen	and	Brauner	(2015)	consider	the	relevance	of	PI	to	LIS	by	examining	its	treatment	
of	materials	and	processes	of	relevance	to	LIS,	and	conclude	that	the	definition	of	
information	within	PI	is	more	appropriate	than	that	in	numerous	other	theories	of	
information;	see	also	Pleshkevich	(2016)	for	a	perspective	based	in	the	Russian	literature..	
Dinnen	and	Brauner	raise	one	problem	which	had	caused	problems	for	the	acceptance	of	PI	
within	LIS;	its	insistence	on	the	truthfulness	of	information.	While	this	may	be	readily	
avoided	by	suggesting,	as	Floridi	does,	that	what	LIS	deals	with	is	meaningful	data	/	
semantic	content,	this	has	posed	an	apparently	psychological	problem	to	some	LIS	
specialists,	who	dislike	the	idea	that	what	they	deal	with	is	not	information.	However,	
Dinneen	and	Brauner	argue	that	this	is	not	a	significant	problem	in	accepting	the	PI	
definitions	for	LIS,	as	does	Fyffe	(2015).	Semantic	content	includes	fiction	and	other	forms	of	
material	of	relevance	to	LIS	(Van	der	Veer	Martens	2015).	And	in	general	LIS	has	never	been	
concerned	with	the	truth	of	information	per	se,	but	with	the	quality	of	semantic	content,	
specifically	with	the	accuracy,	authority,	and	completeness	of	testimony	(Fallis	2004,	2016),	
clearly	within	the	remit	of	PI	(Floridi	2014B,	Floridi	and	Illari	2014).	
	
So	we	conclude	that	PI	is	indeed	able	to	deal	with	all	the	forms	of	information	and	
documents	with	which	LIS	is	concerned.	Indeed,	Van	der	Veer	Martens	(2015)	suggests	that	
this	may	be	one	of	the	ways	in	which	LIS	may	contribute	to	PI:	the	variety	of	types	of	
documents	dealt	with	by	LIS	may	lead	to	a	helpful	revision	an	extension	of	the	ontology	of	
information	within	PI.		
	
5.2	Information	in	the	wider	world	
At	its	most	fundamental	level,	PI	addresses	the	nature	of	reality	itself,	arguing	that	it	is	
informational,	consisting	at	root	of	a	kind	of	fundamental	data:	'dedomena',	"mind-
independent	points	of	lack	of	uniformity	in	the	fabric	of	Being",	whose	inter-relations	
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account	for	all	structured	entities	in	the	world.	This	is	the	philosophy	of	'informational	
structural	realism'	(Floridi	2011,	Ward	Bynum	2016),	which	holds	that	there	is	an	observer-
independent	reality,	whose	ultimate	nature	is	neither	physical	or	mental,	but	informational,	
and	defined	by	the	interactions	between	informational	entities.	
		
PI	can	also	be	related	to	the	idea	of	information	as	a	fundamental	constituent	of	the	
physical	world,	through,	for	example,	the	idea	of	quantum	informational	structural	realism	
(Ward	Byman	2013).	Floridi	(2010B)	notes	the	physicist	Frank	Wilczek's	(2008)	idea	that	
matter	is	a	function	of	the	'Grid',	what	we	perceive	as	empty	space,	but	is	actually	a	highly	
structured	entity,	to	be	a	physical	counterpart	of	the	infosphere.	There	are	numerous	other	
ways	in	which	information	may	enter	physical	considerations	(Bawden	and	Robinson	2013A,	
Harshman	2016),	and	while	these	may	not	have	a	bearing	on	day-to-day	LIS	activities,	they	
enable	a	pleasing	linkage,	if	not	unification,	of	the	different	usages	of	the	information	
concept	(Robinson	and	Bawden	2014).	PI,	rooted	in	the	idea	of	data	as	a	discernible	
difference	in	the	world,	is	well	placed	to	aid	such	a	linkage.		
	
It	is	worth	emphasising,	as	does	Floridi	(2016C)	that	PI	is	not	intended	to	provide	a	single,	
unified	theory	of	information	in	all	domains.	Rather	it	provides	a	formal	framework	for	
linking	and	relating	the	various	aspects	and	manifestations	of	information,	and	hence	for	
integrating,	though	not	in	a	reductionist	way,	the	information-centred	disciplines,	including	
LIS.	This	seems	to	us	to	be	a	very	attractive	feature	of	PI	for	LIS,	which	has	always	been	
concerned	about	its	place	in	the	intellectual	world	(Dillon	2007,	Bawden	2015).		
	
5.3	Information	ethics	and	information	society	
That	PI	should	begin	with	an	ontological	analysis	of	information	per	se,	and	lead	directly	into	
a	system	of	ethics	based	on	this,	is	one	of	its	most	remarkable	features	(Ess	2008),	and	one	
which	makes	it	compelling	as	a	basis	for	LIS.	No	alternative	philosophical	foundation	yet	
proposed	has	attempted	such	a	broad	scope.		
		
Furner	(2010,	p.	172)	points	out	that	PI	is	embedded	in	social	theory,	and	that	"Floridi's	
conception	of	the	infosphere	is	in	itself	an	original	contribution	to	our	understanding	of	the	
development	of	the	information	society".	He	also	notes	that	PI's	ethical	dimension	is	
important	in	claiming	relevance	for	LIS.	When	combined	with	the	possible	extension	of	PI	
beyond	IE	to	law,	economics	and	politics	(Floridi	2015),	it	seems	clear	to	us	that	those	who	
have	claimed	that	PI	is	lacks	a	full	social	dimension	are	seriously	mistaken.	
	
There	was	an	early	concern	about	IE,	based	on	the	misunderstanding	that	its	insistence	on	
the	intrinsic	information	value	of	all	entities	leads	necessarily	to	an	'egalitarianism'	in	all	
things;	that	"a	work	of	Shakespeare	is	as	valuable	as	a	piece	of	pulp	fiction,	and	a	human	
being	as	valuable	as	a	vat	of	toxic	waste"	(Brey	2008,	p.	112).	Such	criticisms	unfortunately	
persist,	as	in	the	suggestion	that	following	a	Floridean	ethic	would	lead	us	to	allow	HIV	to	
persist	and	cause	the	death	of	people,	and	that	we	would	conclude	that,	since	all	political	
ideas	have	some	informational	value,	the	more	Nazis	there	are	the	better	(Fuchs	2016),	as	
well	as	more	nuanced	criticisms	such	as	those	of	Capurro	(2008).		Floridi	has,	we	believe,	
convincingly	answered	such	criticisms	in	various	places	(see.	for	example,	Floridi	2008;	see	
also	Taddeo	2016)	to	the	effect	that	because	every	entity	is	assigned	some	moral	
(informational)	value	to	begin	with,	does	not	imply	that	they	will	continue	to	have	the	same	
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value	after	any	thought	has	been	applied:	"the	point	at	stake	is	not	some	daft	idea	about	
the	intrinsic	value	of	Shakespeare	versus	Dan	Brown"	(Floridi	2008,	p.	193).	
	
We	would	also	add	that	we	believe	that	anyone	who	reads	Floridi's	'On	human	dignity	as	a	
foundation	for	the	right	to	privacy'	(2016D),	with	its	evocation	of	human	exceptionalism	as	
"each	of	us,	as	a	beautiful	glitch,	is	a	fragile	and	very	pliable	entity	whose	life	is	essentially	
made	of	information",	will	find	it	hard	to	argue	that	PI	lacks	a	humanistic	perspective.	
	
It	was	recognised	a	decade	ago	that	Floridi's	IE	was	able	to	address	issues	of	direct	concern	
to	LIS,	such	as	the	laws	governing	privacy	and	intellectual	property	(Burk	2008,	Ess	2008,	Ess	
2009).	Even	so,	IE	has	been	criticised	at	various	times	as	being	too	abstract,	and	not	giving	
help	in	specific	situations	(see,	for	example,	Mathieson	2004,	and	Stahl	2008).	Floridi	sees	
this	as	arguably	a	virtue,	since	what	is	provided	is	a	common	framework	within	which	may	
be	made	detailed	ethical	and	legal	proscriptions	for	particular	topics	(Floridi	2008,	Ess	2009).	
This	is	an	example	of	where	LIS	may	not	only	benefit	from,	but	also	contribute	to,	PI,	as	in	
the	City	University	studies	of	informational	privacy	(Pedley	2017).	
	
5.4	The	information	environment	and	the	fourth	revolution	
Floridi's	concepts	of	the	fourth	revolution,	the	infosphere,	and	onlife,	all	directly	drawn	from	
PI,	give	us	a	new	perspective	for	understanding	the	radical,	rapidly-developing,	and	often	
confusing,	changes	in	the	information	environment	which	cause	continual	reassessment	of	
the	nature	and	purpose	of	LIS.		
	
The	four	revolutions	are	Copernican,	Darwinian,	Freudian	and	Informational;	revolutions	in	
that	they	radically	change	humanity's	view	of	itself,	and	its	place	in	the	world.	It	is	worth	
noting	that	Floridi's	fourth,	Information,	revolution	is	not,	as	is	often	imagined,	to	be	
equated	with	the	advent	of	the	digital	computer,	or	the	internet;	it	did	not	begin	with	
Shannon	or	von	Neumann,	with	Turing	or	Berners	Lee.	It	is	much	older,	stemming	from	the	
origins	of	recorded	information;	but	it	has	now	come	to	the	fore	because	digital	information	
and	communication	has	come	to	have	such	a	dramatic	impact	(Floridi	2014A,	2017).	This	is	
surely	a	perspective	very	appropriate	for	LIS.	There	are,	however,	other	interpretations	of	
the	information	revolution	which	are	also	consistent	with	PI.	Giardino	(2016)	prefers	to	
think	of	Floridi's	fourth	revolution	as	a	second	information	revolution,	encompassing	the	
stages	from	cultural	transmission	to	online	communication,	and	preceded	by	a	first,	and	
essentially	biological,	information	revolution,	from	encoding	in	DNA	to	cultural	
transmission.	From	a	history	of	technology	perspective,	perhaps	more	familiar	to	those	in	
LIS,	Beavers	(2012)	proposes	a	sequence	of	four	information	revolutions:	writing,	printing,	
multimedia	and	digital	information.	Floridi	(2016E)	agrees	that	both	of	these	are	also	fruitful	
ways	of	viewing	the	fourth	revolution	as	the	context	for	PI.	
	
This	evokes	another	reason	for	accepting	PI	as	a	foundation	for	LIS;	it	is	able	to	guide	us	
through	the	very	rapid	and	far-reaching	changes	in	the	practice	of	LIS,	resulting	from	the	
changing	information	environment	of	the	fourth	revolution.	Floridi	had	actually	drawn	
attention	to	the	consequences	for	libraries	at	a	very	early	stage,	although,	as	Van	der	Veer	
Martens	(2015)	points	out,	it	went	largely	unnoticed	by	anyone	in	LIS:	"..	the	library	itself	
may	disappear,	as	we	move	from	the	holding	and	lending	library,	which	stores	knowledge	
physically	recorded	on	paper,	to	the	consulting	library,	which	provides	access	to	electronic	
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information	on	the	network	...	finally	from	the	library	as	a	building	to	the	library	as	a	gate	
node	in	the	virtual	space	of	the	digital	encyclopedia"	(Floridi	1995,	p.	264).	[Floridi	(2010)	
tells	us	that	he	came	upon	the	idea	of	PI	on	the	banks	of	the	Cherwell	in	Oxford	in	the	
summer	of	1998;	it	seems	that	his	thoughts	on	libraries	may	have	played	some	part	in	its	
formulation.]	And	so	our	final	section	considers	what	PI	implies	for	the	developing	practice	
of	LIS.	
	
5.5	Curators	of	the	infosphere	
The	significance	of	PI	for	the	practice	of	LIS	is	cogently	summed	up	by	Floridi:	"The	library	
and	information	community	...	are	experiencing	a	profound	evolution	of	their	role	from	
keepers	to	curators	of	the	infosphere"	(CILIP	2017).	Building	on	the	ideas	of	Fyffe	and	Van	
der	Veer	Martens	that	ontic	stewardship	is	a	logical	development	of	PI,	this	shows	that	LIS	
can	indeed	fruitfully	be	regarded	as	applied	PI.	The	active	role	of	curation,	first	explicitly	
stated	for	LIS	by	Fyffe	(2015),	is	crucial,	and	not	only	in	directing	the	preservation	of	the	
human	record.	It	should	also	help	in	LIS's	search	for	its	remit	in	helping	to	overcome	some	
of	the	perceived	problems	of	the	current	information	environment:	fake	news,	post-truth,	
alternative	facts,	filter	bubbles,	and	the	rest	(Bawden	2017).	
		
	
6	Conclusions	
Dineen	(2017,	p.	1)	writes	“It	has	become	easy	to	make	a	case	for	the	relevance,	richness,	
and	importance	of	philosophical	thinking	for	information	research	and	practice”	This	is	a	
rather	new,	and	pleasing,	situation,	and	we	feel	that	the	advent	of	PI	has	played	a	large	part	
in	its	achievement.	It	is	salutary	to	note	how	much	the	arguments	in	Floridi's	2002	and	2004	
articles	have	stood	the	test	of	time,	and	how	long	it	has	taken	for	them	to	be	accepted.		
	
Van	der	Veer	Martens	(2015,	p.	348)	suggests	that	"...	LIS	may	just	be	as	important	to	PI	as	
PI	is	to	LIS	in	terms	of	deepening	our	mutual	understanding	of	information	ontologies,	the	
dynamics	of	informational	domains,	and	the	variety	of	evolving	relationships	among	
information	organisms	and	information	objects".	This	is	certainly	ambitious,	but	not,	we	
think,	unrealistic.		
	
Tom	Wilson	(2016),	reviewing	The	fourth	revolution	wrote	that	"information	science,	if	it	is	
to	continue	to	exist,	[must]	become	holistic,	rather	than	focussed	narrowly	on	such	matters	
as	information	retrieval;	this	could	be	a	foundation	text	for	such	a	field".	We	believe	that	
the	same	is	true	for	PI	in	general,	forming	the	foundation	for	a	broad	LIS.	It	is	certainly	more	
attractive,	and	fruitful	for	developments	in	both	research	and	practice,	than	the	pre-PI	
concept	that	Popper's	philosophy	might	be	the	basis	for	information	science,	and	SE	the	
basis	for	a	wholly	separate	library	science.	
	
We	suggest	that	the	time	may	be	right	for	a	research	programme,	building	on	the	initiatives	
noted	above,	to	investigate	the	relations	between	PI	and	LIS.	This	should	offer	reciprocal	
advantages,	as	each	topic	enriches	the	other.	Three	main	strands	within	LIS	seem	
appropriate	for	investigation	in	this	way:	
	
1.	Information	and	documents	within	LIS,	using	PI	to	investigate	the	ontology	and	
epistemology	of	the	section	of	the	infosphere	of	particular	relevance	to	LIS,	and	affecting	
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particularly	document	theory	and	knowledge	organisation.	Revisiting	the	traditional	LIS	
data-information-knowledge	framework,	this	is	timely	in	view	of	the	new	forms	of	
document	with	which	LIS	will	have	to	deal	(immersive),	and	the	increasing	involvement	of	
LIS	in	big	data	issues.	
	
2.	Information	dynamics,	applying	PI	on	the	one	hand	to	the	information	user	(information	
behaviour	and	practices,	digital	literacy)	and	on	the	other	to	LIS	activities	such	as	
preservation	and	archival	selection.	
	
3.	LIS	ethics,	applying	PI	to	issues	such	as	privacy,	intellectual	property,	information	access,	
and	the	ethical	duties	of	information	providers	
	
Jonathan	Furner	(2010,	p,	173)	writes:	"It	is	to	be	hoped	that	projects	in	which	PI	is	applied	
to	topics	in	Floridi's	broad	categories	of	information	dynamics	continue	to	attract	willing	
volunteers.	There	is	much	to	be	done."	We	could	not	agree	more.		
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